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JUDGE RICHARD POSNER'S
JURISPRUDENCE
Robert S. Summers*
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE. By Richard A. Posner. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1990. Pp. xiv, 485. $29.95.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Judge Posner is justly famous for his work on the economic analysis of law (and for many fine judicial opinions). He has also immersed
himself in jurisprudential, philosophical, moral, scientific, and other
literature, and has in The Problems of Jurisprudence now worked out
and published his views on many of the traditional problems of jurisprudence. In some instances, he adopts the general jurisprudential positions of earlier thinkers. In other instances, his views are more his
own creation.
I will only treat Judge Posner's general views (although not comprehensively) on the nature of law and legal validity, on formality and
the formalistic in law, on statutory interpretation, on precedent, on
law's autonomy, and, very briefly, on legal education. I have had to be
selective. These topics comprise no more than half of those Judge Posner addresses.

II.

THE NATURE OF LAW AND LEGAL VALIDITY

Judge Posner adopts a predictivist and behaviorist theory of law.
He also indicates, correctly, that I will "disagree" with his theory (p.
26 n.41). Here are his core ideas:
Although unlikely to posit the existence of so abstract an entity as
"the law,'' Holmes realized that since law affected behavior it was "real"
in some sense. The solution to the dilemma was to ask how law affects
behavior. The state has coercive power, and people want to know how
to keep out of the way of that power. So they go to lawyers for advice.
All they want to know is whether the power of the state will come down
on them if they engage in a particular course of action. To advise them
the lawyer must predict how the judges, who decide when the state's
• McRoberts Research Professor of Law, Cornell University; Arthur L. Goodhart Visiting
Professor of Legal Science, Cambridge University 1991-1992. B.S. 1955, University of Oregon;
LL.B. 1959, Harvard Law School. - Ed. The author wishes to thank Kathy Wimsatt for valuable assistance in preparing the manuscript, and Professors Russell Osgood, Sterling Harwood,
and Dale Oesterle for valuable discussion. The author also wishes to thank his research assistants, Mr. David Lisi, Cornell Law School Class of 1991, and Mr. John Moscati, Cornell Law
School Class of 1992.
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coercive power may be applied to a person, will act if his client engages
in the proposed course of action and is sued. Law is thus simply a prediction of how state power will be deployed in particular circumstances.
Law, an abstract entity, is dissolved into physical force, also an abstract
entity but one that has a more solid ring and, more important, can be
interpreted in behavioral terms: if I do X, the sheriff will eventually
seize and sell property of mine worth $Y. The prediction theory conceives the law as disposition rather than as object. To say of an act that
it is unlawful is to predict certain consequences if the act is performed,
just as to say that an object is heavy is to predict certain consequences if
it is dropped or thrown.
This conception overlooks the people who obey the law because it is
the law, and so it has come to be called the "bad man" theory of law.
But the oversight may not be critical. There may not be many "good
men" in the specific sense of people who comply with laws merely out of
respect for law, a felt moral obligation to obey it. [p. 223]
We can if we like say that the judges, in acting - that is, in deciding
cases - "make law," and so the law is what judges do as well as predictions of what they will do. There is no contradiction once the prediction
theory is subsumed under a broader activity theory of law. The important thing is that law is something that licensed persons, mainly judges,
lawyers, and legislators, do . . . . [p. 225]

It is evident from the foregoing key passages that Judge Posner, in
addressing the question: "What is law?," does not, in more traditional
fashion, construe this question to require a jurisprudential analysis of
the general nature of a system of law as a whole. 1 Thus, he displays
little interest in such issues as the foundations of a legal order, or the
structure and unity of a legal system, or the nature and varieties of
rules in a legal system, or the essential techniques used to secure law's
goals. Rather, although he does not put it this way, Judge Posner is
here mainly interested in what legal theorists refer to as the theory of
legal validity, that is, a theory of what criteria putative law must satisfy to be valid. His focus is on "law as a source of rights, duties, and
powers," and still more narrowly, on law so conceived from the vantage point of a judge in the American system. 2
The theories, above, that Judge Posner adopts on the subject of
legal validity were made famous by Holmes - predictivism3 - and
Llewellyn - behaviorism.4 Judge Posner is aware that these theories
have been subjected to what are now rather standard objections. Yet
1. Cj, e.g., H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
2. P. 221. At several places, he articulates the view that law really dissolves entirely into
physical force. See pp. 223, 296, 455. He seems unaware of the vast literature highly critical of
the "force" conception, and he makes no attempt to address any of the now standard objections
to that position. For a summary of these objections, see Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HARV. L. REv. 433, 445-46 (1978).
3. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459, 460-61 (1897).
4. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 3 (1930) ("What these officials do about disputes
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he offers little argument in response to these objections. It would be
tedious to rehearse here all of these objections, and in any case I have
already set them out elsewhere. 5 I will restrict myself largely to some
points that I consider to be most telling. I will stress that what Judge
Posner offers cannot, conceptually, qualify as a theory of legal validity,
and whether or not I am right about this, I will show that what he
offers is simply not the theory of validity prevalent in our legal system.
There is, of course, tension between the two basic notions Judge
Posner stresses here: valid law as a prediction of judicial action, and
valid law as what judges do. Although these often overlap, they sometimes diverge, and then one rather than the other must prevail. Judge
Posner apparently believes that what the judges do is the law, even if
this turns out not to be the predictable outcome (p. 225).
The fundamental flaw in any predictive-behavioral conceptualization of legal validity is precisely that the ultimate "criterion" of valid
law is simply what the judges do. In such a conceptualization, the
highest judges simply cannot make mistakes of law. If whatever they
ultimately do is ipso facto valid, they cannot be mistaken. This, as
H.L.A. Hart stressed many years ago, confuses judicial finality with
infallibility and immunizes judges' behavior from criticism for nonconformity with law. 6 Contrary to Judge Posner's position, a legal
system must have legal standards for identifying valid law (and for
interpreting and applying it in particular cases). Insofar as judges
identify and apply law at variance with these standards, they make
legal mistakes, and are accordingly subject to criticism on precisely
this ground. 7 Such criticism, along with the potential for it in particular cases, forms one of the major avenues through which the rule of
law is sustained in our society. At one point, Judge Posner manifests
some awareness of this kind of objection to his theory:
We think oflaw not only as what judges do but also as the criterion for
evaluating what they do. The activity [behavioral] theory is incomplete.
Its critics are right that it is an impoverished theory oflaw. But it is only
mildly impoverished. When slightly enriched with a weak sense of natural law, it becomes the best positive theory of law that we have. [p. 228]

Even if Judge Posner patches up his theory with a bit of natural
law (in his terms, "ethical" and "policy" considerations), this cannot
remedy the foregoing basic flaw. For that flaw differs from the one
Judge Posner seeks to correct. The basic flaw in his theory is its failis, to my mind, the law itself."). See Llewellyn's own retraction in K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 8-10 (1960).
5. See generally R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY chs. 45 (1982).
6. H. HART, supra note 1, at 138-44.

7. Of course, where a court is acting to change the law, this action is not to be characterized
as a mistake, although it may be criticized on other grounds. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at
114.
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ure to make an appropriate place for the possibility of mistaken identifications of valid law. This failure, in turn, leaves no place for that
social practice so essential to maintenance of the rule of law, namely,
criticism of judicial behavior precisely on the ground that it fails to
conform to accepted legal standards for identifying valid law.
In sum, behavioral "criteria" of valid law simply cannot constitute
criteria of valid law independent of what judges actually do. Thus, a
behavioral theory cannot qualify as a theory of legal validity in the
first place. Such a theory necessarily requires independent legal criteria of validity.
Judge Posner, nevertheless, does not lack the courage of his convictions. His predictivist-behavioral theory leads him to view precedents, and, presumably, statutes and other forms of law, merely as
"essential inputs into the predictive process" (p. 227). Thus, he says,
precedents "are not 'the law' itself" (p. 227). These are merely behavioral inputs. (A fortiori, rules and principles governing the techniques
accepted within the system for interpreting and applying valid law are
also in no sense law.) Yet he suggests from time to time that it is at
least a criticism of a legal theory that it is quite at variance with normal legal usage (p. 228). Certainly our normal legal usage is to regard
as law, even for the highest judges, those precedents and statutes that
are valid under the criteria of validity prevalent in our system.
If I am correct that Judge Posner's theory of legal validity is conceptually incapable of serving as a theory of legal validity, it follows
that his theory cannot be the theory of legal validity that prevails in
our system. Our overall theory of validity is highly complex, as the
admirable writing of Professor Greenawalt attests. 8 The theory that
prevails in our system includes (1) an independent and largely antecedent set of source-oriented standards for determining valid law, and
(2) various content-oriented standards. 9 What I call source-oriented
standards include due enactment by a duly authorized legislature in
the case of statutes, and proper adoption by appropriate courts in the
case of precedents. Content- oriented standards include various substantive requirements of constitutions. Only a small book or an extended essay could provide a comprehensive account. What the law is
on a given point is determined by reference to these independent criteria, and lawyers advise clients in light of the substantive or procedural
law so identified (and in light of techniques of interpretation and application prevalent within our system). 10 Thus, valid precedents and
8. Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REv. 621 (1987);
see also R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 101-35; Summers, Toward a Better General Theory of
Legal Validity, 16 RECHTSTHEORIE 65 (1985).
9. See infra section 111.B.
10. Of course, Judge Posner understands these things. What he does not grasp so clearly is
how they embarrass his general theory. Sometimes it seems that by a "prediction" theory, Judge
Posner might only be referring to the necessarily future-regarding processes whereby a lawyer or
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valid statutes are considered valid law as such, and not mere "inputs"
in processes of prediction. It is a very great virtue of our system that
citizens generally need not wait until a court acts before they can
know their legal rights (and in many cases they can know those rights
with great certainty). Of course, unclear cases arise in which there are
no determinate answers, but Judge Posner concedes that predictivism
itself is "unusable in areas of profound legal uncertainty" (p. 224).
Judge Posner wants, for present purposes, to conceptualize precedents, statutes, and presumably other forms of law merely as "inputs"
into judicial behavior (pp. 227, 239). A mere "input" is not as such a
norm, yet precedents and statutes are, properly conceived, normative
phenomena under which legal reasons for action arise - reasons
which are binding on citizens and officials, including judges. Indeed,
judicial behavior becomes open. to criticism when it disregards such
binding reasons. Precedents and statutes have normative significance
in still other ways, too. For example, they serve as bases for claims of
right. Predictivism and behaviorism, however empiricist they may be,
are also doctrines that cannot yield, let alone do justice to, the normative character of law. Rather, they obscure it. 11

III.

FORMALITY AND THE "FORMALISTIC" IN LAW

Judge Posner is primarily interested in the substance of the law,
not its form. He therefore shares the preoccupation of most American
legal theorists with substantive "policy" and "principle" to the neglect
of legal formality in all its varieties. Relatedly, his favorite critical
epithet appears to be "formalistic," a term of legal criticism in
America the precise meaning of which is often left unspecified. 12
Judge Posner rarely addresses frontally any of the general varieties of
legal formality to be found in law, nor does he systematically consider
the general rationales for their existence. 13 Indeed, he usually does not
even recognize legal formality in the law for what it is. He proclaims,
rather, that "I am not a formalist" (pp. 33), as if it were possible for a
careful theorist to be a nonformalist. To Judge Posner, and to countlower court judge identifies, interprets, and applies law in accord with applicable legal standards.
I have argued elsewhere that this is not really a predictivist theory at all. R. SUMMERS, supra
note 5, at 118.
11. Again, Judge Posner knows that law is, somehow, normative. What he does not grasp is
how his theory obscures and distorts this fact. (I, of course, do not claim that from the normativity of law it follows that all law is good. This is a complex matter that I cannot go into here.)
12. Professor Brian Simpson has observed that the term "formalism" in legal criticism is the
"most ill defined of legal ailments". Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts,
46 U. CHI. L. RBv. 533, 534 (1979).
13. For a preliminary effort in this vein, see Summers, Theory, Formality, and Practical Legal
Criticism, 106 LAW Q. RBv. 407 (1990) [hereinafter Summers, Theory]. See also P. ATIYAH &
R. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1987); Summers, Statutes
and Contracts as Founts of Formal Reasoning in EssAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH (forthcoming
1991).
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less American legal theorists and other academics, formality simply
has no appropriate place in law - law is all substance and no form.
Were Judge Posner to address himself more frontally to the nature,
varieties, and roles of formality in law, he would come to see that the
law is shot through with formality, that nearly all the varieties of formality found in law are in varying degrees essential to law, and that
legal formality is not without its own distinctive substantive justifications. He would also come to see that more precise meanings for "formalistic" can be specified, and that law can be criticized not merely for
being overformal, or "formalistic," 14 but also for being underformal,
or "substantivistic."ls
Judge Posner criticizes as "formalistic" both the actual phenomena
of our law and the theories of legal theorists about these phenomena. I
think he is correct to suggest that we can get a sense of what is meant
by "formalistic" if we bring a "form versus substance" contrast into
play and then seek to unpack criticism for overformality in light of
this contrast (p. 40). But he does not see the numerous "form versus
substance" contrasts at work in law and legal criticism. There is not
just one possibly "useful" sense of "formalistic," but many. 16 And
nowhere does Judge Posner identify even a single basic variety oflegal
formality and treat it for what it is, namely, one of various essentially
formal elements of law itself, with its own special set of rationales. Of
course, these background rationales are themselves substantive, and
may even be thought of as the substance oflegal formality. Still, as we
will see, this leaves intact the more specific form-substance contrasts in
the foreground.
I will examine a limited number of form-substance contrasts in the
law, identify essential varieties of formality involved, and clarify the
more specific senses of the overformal (the "formalistic") parasitic on
these contrasts. This approach also enables me to suggest something
of the range and variety of types of justified formality in the law and
the varied rationales for them. Despite sixty or seventy years of unrelenting academic and other criticism asserting that nearly everything
wrong with the law is "formalistic," American law has not yet today
ended up as "all substance and no form." Nor could it.
Law must be analyzed in terms of complex fusions and interactions
of various types of formality with relevant substance. Instead of proclaiming "I am not a formalist," Judge Posner should recognize and
embrace necessary and justified formality in the law, and, only in regard to the overformal, proclaim that he is not "formalistic." Thus,
he should say that he is a "formalist" as well as a "substantivist," each
14. Judge Posner does not always use "formalistic" pejoratively, but he usually does.
15. See generally Summers, Theory, supra note 13, at 408-09.
16. See generally Summers Theory, supra note 13; K. ENGISCH, BEITRAGE ZUR RECHTSTHEORIE 251-85 (1984).
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in the measure appropriate to the relevant form-substance fusion
under analysis. This fundamental jurisprudential truth is not at all
well understood in America today, at least not in these terms.
In the following sections, I seek to demonstrate the foregoing in a
general way (although without continuously revisiting Judge Posner's
own particular views). In each topic, I introduce a basic variety of
formality, identify some of the justifications for its existence in law,
and suggest how it may go awry as "formalistic." Here I can only
identify several of the varieties of formality in the law, and I cannot
subject each to the detailed analysis it merits. Nor can I explore the
conceptual necessity of each, let alone the nature and bearing of the
various underlying rationales that (with problem-specific considerations) determine the appropriate levels or degrees of the varieties of
formality as they appear in the law. Yet the varieties I take up are
sufficient to indicate the rich and multifaceted nature of legal formality, phenomena more often known in our system by other
nomenclature.
A. Systems of Law

A legal system is, in the most general terms, a complex fusion of
form and substance. It is substantive in that it must, to exist in the
first place, contain a certain minimum substantive content. Thus,
without rules restricting the free use of force, rules protecting at least
some types of private property, and rules enforcing certain types of
promises, a legal system would lack the substance required to secure
the popular cooperation necessary for official uses of coercion against
malefactors. Without this cooperation the system could not be
viable.17
On the other hand, even at this very general level of analysis, the
legal system has a contrasting side that may be characterized as formal. Thus, among other things, a legal system must have rules and
other preceptual forms to "house" this minimum substantive content;
these preceptual forms must be brought into being authoritatively, and
there must be authoritative processes for identifying such precepts and
for interpreting and applying them in contested cases. These preceptual forms and these processes are all content-independent, and thus in
this sense formal. We can readily see that powerful substantive rationales justify this formal side of the law, including a concern for legitimacy, for rationality, for orderliness, and for definitive resolution of
substantive disputes in the making and application of law. 18 Surely,
then, with regard to the constitutive structure and content of a legal
system, the theorist would not want to sa~, with Judge Posner, "I am
17. See H. HART, supra note 1, at 189-95.
18. There are other rationales, but there is no need to go into them.
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not a formalist.,, The foregoing general variety of formality in a legal
system is a necessity, and even a high level of it is justified in light of
the above rationales.
Now, this general contrast between form and substance, as well as
the fusion of form and substance I have described, provides the basis
for analyzing appropriate levels of a basic variety of formality - "constitutive formality" - and for specifying the meaning here of the critical expression "formalistic.,, The appropriately formal analysis
honors the requisite fusion of form and substance in light of the above
rationales for constitutive formality. The "formalistic" does not. It is
overformal, and thus neglects requisite substance in some way. For
example, the theory of a positivist who contends that a legal system
can have "just any substantive content" and still remain a legal system
may be justly criticized as formalistic - as neglecting the requisite
minimum substantive content of law.
B. Legal Validity

In a legal system such as ours, the criteria for identifying valid law
may be considered a complex unity of form and substance. Within
this system, some types of putative law cannot qualify as valid law
unless they satisfy not merely formal, "source- oriented" criteria of validity but also substantive, "content-oriented" criteria (which may
themselves derive from authoritative sources). For example, to be
valid, it may be that a putative law must not only be duly adopted by
an authorized legal source such as a legislature, but also must not offend the substantive, content-oriented requirements of a constitution.
Again, powerful rationales support such "source-oriented" (and therefore formal) criteria of validity. These include legitimacy, legislative
autonomy, representative democracy, and the minimum definitiveness
required of enacted law. It is difficult to imagine a theorist addressing
such formal criteria of validity who would want to say here: "I am not
a formalist." A source-oriented and therefore content-independent
criterion of valid law is an essential element in this complex fusion of
form and substance, an element that may be called "validity"
formality.
It is now possible to see readily how a theorist could go astray here
and, in regard to a particular system, present a purportedly descriptive
theory of validity that merits criticism as "formalistic." Suppose, for
example, that such a theorist advances a descriptive theory that, in our
own system, only formal, source- oriented criteria determine the validity of precedent. That is, precedent only needs to be laid down by an
appropriate court to be valid. Such a theory would be mistaken because our system also generally requires that a precedent survive some
period of evaluation or testing for minimum substantive rationality if
that precedent is to take its place as "settled" and therefore as valid
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law within our system. 19 Here, we would say that the theory is formalistically inaccurate and thus undersubstantive. That is, the theory
acknowledges only the formal, source-oriented criterion of validity
and entirely neglects the content-oriented, substantive criterion that in
fact also applies to determine the validity of precedent in our system.
(Of course, a prescriptive theory might be formalistic, too.)
C.

Continuity and Change in Law

Many features of legal institutions and processes and many legal
devices and techniques may operate, by design or otherwise, to inhibit
change in the substantive content of law. At least insofar as this is by
design, so that these features, devices, and techniques secure some
continuity of the law's content independently of the quality of its substance, we may view these features, devices, and techniques together as
exhibiting and securing a general kind of formality - call it "continuity formality," a variety of formality that is frequently not recognized for what it is. Plainly, some legal systems exhibit very high
continuity formality.
To be more specific, the formal features of legal institutions and
processes that secure continuity include those that operate in legislatures to inhibit the adoption of new substantive law. These features
consist of formal procedural requirements - not only for amending
old statutes, but for passing new ones. There are functionally similar
formal features of adjudicative processes} including provision for dismissal of claims on the ground that they are not yet recognized in law,
as well as various doctrines such as standing and ripeness that limit
the justiciability of issues at the trial court level. Similarly, various
content-independent norms limit the power to overrule precedent at
the appellate level.
Still other legal devices and techniques secure continuity of law
regardless of the quality of its substantive content. For example, case
law may be transformed into formal statute law, which is generally
rather less changeable than case law. Also, the power of courts to
exercise discretion may be transformed into relatively hard and fast
rules.
Various powerful rationales justify a significant general level of
what I here call continuity formality, and thus justify the features of
institutions and processes, and other devices and techniques, that secure it. Continuity of substantive content in law avoids the confusions
of excessive legal change, facilitates planning, protects citizen reliance,
19. See R. SUMMERS, LoN L. FULLER 50 (1984); Summers, Summers's Primer on Fuller's
Jurisprudence - A Wholly Disinterested Assessment of the Reviews by Professors Wueste and
LeBe/, 71 CoRNELL L. REv. 1231, 1247-48 (1986); see also Hart, Holmes' Positivism - An
Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929, 936 n.21 (1951).
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and more. Given the force of these rationales, few theorists should
want to say: "I am not a formalist."
On the other hand, when the various features of lawmaking
processes and other formal devices and techniques of the law function
in ways that secure continuity at the expense of needed substantive
change and growth in the law's content, this level of continuity formality may be appropriately criticized as overformal, that is, formalistic. Indeed a whole system might ossify. A theory that embraces legal
continuity excessively is formalistic. Such a theory unduly privileges
the content-independent (formal) features of the system favoring continuity.20 In a relatively "closed" system, excessive continuity formality may drive change underground, so that change occurs mainly
through legal fictions and the like, rather than out in the open. It
should hardly be surprising that judicial resort to legal fictions is
sometimes criticized as formalistic, too.

D. Particular Laws and Legal Doctrines
Particular laws and legal doctrines can themselves also be analyzed as complex fusions of form and substance in which several varieties of formality commonly play appropriate roles. Among the
varieties of formality that play roles in the creation and application of
valid law and legal doctrine are:
(1) the formality of arbitrary yet justified fiat in the material content of
a law or doctrine
(2) the formality of modes of expressing the law (for example, the canonical form of a statute)
(3) the formality of the preceptual design of a law or doctrine - its
"close-endedness" (as in the case of a narrow rule)

Each of these types of formality (and there are others) involves a
somewhat different form-substance contrast, and the various rationales behind each are not identical (although they overlap). At the
same time, each may go awry and be subject to criticism as overformal
and thus "formalistic." A theorist might grasp the essence of these
points without realizing how the phenomena may be appropriately
conceptualized, as above, in terms of legal formality, and without realizing how varying levels of such formality in the law are justified in
terms of the applicable rationales behind them. Such a theorist might
still have a nose for the overformal here, and thus be ready to condemn the "formalistic."
One general example, what I call "close-ended formality," will suffice.21 Close-ended formality is rather special. It is an attribute of the
20. On the importance of "rules of change" in a legal system, see H. HART, supra note 1, at
93-96.
21. For more on close-ended formality, see generally Summers, Theory, supra note 13, at
419-25.
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preceptual form of official commands, statutes, regulations, common
law doctrines, or other species of law. Many different preceptual
forms are known to the law, including general orders, specific orders,
hard and fast rules, flexible rules, principles (of several varieties), general maxims, specific maxims, narrow grants of discretion, broad
grants of discretion, and more. These preceptual forms vary greatly in
the degree to which they are complete as law at inception. The more
complete, the more close- ended. Thus, for example, an enacted precept that takes the form of a hard and fast rule without exceptions is
complete in content at inception, totally close-ended, and thus does
not require an infusion of substantive reasoning to fill it out when it is
applied. On the other hand, broad grants of discretion depend for essential content on infusions of substance by a court (or other body)
when they are applied, and thus display low close- endedness. All
types of law have some degree of close-endedness. The degree of
close-endedness may be justifiably high or low, depending upon applicable rationales (and their interaction with problem-specific
considerations).
Close-endedness is formal because it indicates how far a law is
closed to further authoritative infusion of substantive legal content at
the point of application. Thus, the form-substance contrast here is between (1) nondependence of the law upon further infusion of substantive content at point of application (formal), on the one hand, and (2)
dependence upon such infusion (substantive), on the other.
Even quite high close-ended formality may be justified. Among
the general justifications for high levels are certainty, predictability,
facilitation of citizen planning, equality before the law, ease of administration, and minimization of disputes. Again here, it will not do for
the theorist to say: "I am not a formalist." Formality is, in varying
degrees, essential to law, and even high levels of it may be justified in
some areas. 22
As with all varieties of legal formality, close-endedness may go
awry. For example, a hard and fast and thus formally complete rule
may be overformal because it forecloses desirable (all things considered) judicial infusion of substantive content when the rule is applied.
Yet again, it hardly follows from the "formalistic" character of this
rule that close-ended formality is entirely unjustifiable in the law.
E. Particular Legal Facts
Law must be applied to legal facts, and formality plays a large role
in regard to legal facts. Legal facts may be one thing and actual facts
another. The substance here consists of all possible evidence relevant
22. Judge Posner is, of course, aware of the phenomenon here, although he does not recognize it for what it is - a type of formality. Compare p. 48 ("it would be a mistake to denounce
rules tout court") with p. 445 (legal prudentialism is a cautionary against formalism).
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to the facts in issue before a court (or before another tribunal, or even
before a lawyer advising a client). Yet the law may not require that
the ultimate finding of fact or verdict be based on all the relevant evidence. Indeed, the law may explicitly preclude consideration of all
relevant evidence. In such cases, the finding of fact (or verdict) will
still count as fact for the law's purposes. Insofar as ultimate legal facts
need not be based on all relevant evidence, they reflect a formal theory
of legal truth. Of course, a substantive theory of truth will also be
concurrently at work, for ultimate legal facts must usually rest on
some relevant evidence. Thus again, we have a complex fusion of form
and substance.
To the extent an ultimate finding or verdict contains a formal element, this may be justified by reference to various general rationales,
as well as to various problem-specific considerations that may point in
the same way as the rationales in the circumstances (such as a policy
favoring safety that excludes evidence of repairs subsequent to an accident). The general rationales that operate to justify findings not based
on all the evidence are familiar. They include the efficiency of running
a factfinding process (such as adjudication), not intermittently over a
long period but continuously within a brief period, even though this
means the factfinder cannot hear some witnesses. There is also the
general undesirability of requiring any and all witnesses, no matter
what the circumstances, to attend a factfinding proceeding, and there
is the general importance of finality in factfinding even in the face of
the discovery of further relevant evidence after the proceeding ends.
Because of the force of such rationales (and of any concurrently applicable problem-specific considerations), a legal factfinding may even be
untrue or at least contrary to the probabilities, yet still be accepted as
legally binding on the parties. Here, too, no theorist should, in the
face of this, proclaim: "I am not a formalist," and thus repudiate all
formality in legal factfinding. Instead, the theorist should embrace
some element of "truth formality," as justified, in a system of law.
Of course, processes of factfinding might be overformal, and thus
the system, and also the theory of legal truth for the system, might be
subject to criticism as formalistic. 23 Yet it would hardly follow from
the existence of excessive truth formality in a given factfinding process
that such a process can contain no trace of truth formality not itself
subject to condemnation as formalistic. 24

23. A critique addressed partly to this general type of overformality is Pound, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906) (asserting
that cases should generally be decided on their substantive merits rather than on merely formal
points of pleading).
24. Judge Posner is, of course, cognizant of my basic point here, but again does not conceptualize the phenomena as formal. See pp. 205-06.
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F. Legal Reasoning
Here I will take up several varieties of the formal and the formalistic in legal reasoning. I must open with some preliminary distinctions.
Legal reasons may empower or require judges, other officials, and private citizens and entities to decide or act in indicated ways. Legal
reasons may be deployed to guide, to justify, to criticize, and more.
Such guidance, justification, and criticism typically involve complex
fusions of form and substance within what I call formal reasons, and
as between formal and substantive reasons.
Formal· legal reasons must be differentiated from substantive reasons. Formal legal reasons arise under statutes, precedents, and other
species of valid law, and their legal authoritativeness and content are
in various ways traceable to the valid law under which they arise. Of
course, valid law also has material content, i.e., it is informed by substantive considerations, which in tum inform the content of the formal
legal reasons arising under valid law. 25 As we have seen, authoritativeness might be exclusively formal, as when the validity of the law
under which the reason arises is attributable solely to the operation of
source-oriented (content-independent) standards of validity, such as
due adoption by a legislative body. But even when legal validity is also
attributable to putative law's conformity with substantive standards of
legal validity, the authoritativeness of the law so validated remains
partly attributable to source- oriented, and so formal, standards too.
(Many provisions of our federal constitution embody such substantive
standards.26)
Merely substantive reasons are those a judge or other official or
party concerned with the law invokes in light of applicable moral
norms or policy analysis. Substantive reasons are moral, economic,
political, or other social considerations that do not derive from valid
law, and so lack authoritative formality at the time they are invoked.
Hence they are not as such authoritative, and so are not formal legal
reasons at all.
"Validity formality" - that variety of formality that derives from
compliance of putative law with merely source- oriented standards of
validity - necessarily pervades the law. The rationales justifying this
kind of formality are among the most fundamental of all, and include
the very legitimacy of the law, freedom and autonomy of lawmakers,
considerations ranging from democracy to institutional competence,
and various "rule of law" values. Again, it will not do here to proclaim: "I am not a formalist," as if the law could dispense with such
formal authoritativeness.
Of course, the material content of putative law so validated and the
25. See generally P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 141.
26. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend I.
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legal reasons arising under it may not be substantively very good.
Thus, the reasoning of a higher court adhering to substantively objectionable common law on the ground of its formal authoritativeness
may, at least if the case is extreme enough, be criticized as formalistic,
given that such a court has power to overrule. Similarly, a nomiative
legal theory requiring such adherence may be criticized as formalistic.
In effect, the critic here would be urging that the fusion of authoritative formality with substance in the existing law is so objectionable
that the court should invoke its power to overrule. Once again, a type
of formality is at work here - the authoritativeness of precedent combined with the formal principle of stare decisis - that in appropriate
circumstances generates legally compelling formal reasons. 27
Overformality in the form of excessive regard for the formal authoritativeness of substantively bad case law is hardly the only variety
of the formalistic in legal reasoning. Another species is excessive regard for coherence, consistency, and congruence of decision with antecedent case law, where that law is not really very closely analogous.
Here the variety of formality in the background that has gone awry is,
of course, coherence, consistency, and congruence itself. But simply
because it goes awry in some instances does not justify proclaiming "I
am not a formalist" and dispensing in legal reasoning with coherence,
consistency, and congruence. Powerful substantive rationales lie behind consistency of decision with antecedent case law. 28
Many theorists view "conceptualism" as the most common formalistic vice in legal reasoning. Judge Posner characterizes this vice as
the practice of reasoning to and from concepts merely as a "system of
relations among ideas" without regard to "consequences in the world
of fact" (p. 16). An example might be Langdell's refusal to find a
contract where the party claiming an offered reward did the acts contemplated by the offer (for example, turning over lost goods) without
knowledge of the offer. Langdell argued there was no contract because the party claiming the reward could not have "accepted," in that
an acceptance conceptually requires conscious action , (p. 250). A
nonformalistic judge, Judge Posner tells us, would look to the consequences of liability - for example, whether more lost goods would be
found - and decide accordingly (pp. 251-52). Whether or not this is
an apt example of the overconceptual, and thus of the formalistic, it
certainly implicates an appropriate variety of formality, namely the
conceptual component of the particular doctrine. Again, we could not
dispense with this type of formality. Here the rationales for formality
are rock bottom. If we were to "cleanse" our law of all concepts, there
27. Judge Posner at times appears to reject this. At the very least, he is ambivalent. See pp.
135, 139, 140, 142, 249; see also infra Part IV.
28. Judge Posner would certainly agree, though he does not so conceptualize matters. See,
e.g., p. 249.
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could be no law. Here, to assert "I am not a formalist," yet affirm the
existence of law, would literally make no sense. 29

* * *

For every true version of the "formalistic," there must be a correspondingly appropriate version of legal formality; the appropriate level
of justified legal formality is determined by various general rationales
in interaction with problem-specific considerations. Yet appropriate
formality in the law, in its numerous varieties, does not get due credit
in American jurisprudence. Usually, formality is not recognized for
what it is. Instead, preoccupied with the substantive side of the law,
American theorists neglect the varieties of appropriate formality and
their rationales, and overuse the epithets "formalistic" and "formalism." They are also insufficiently sensitive to the underformal - that
is, to the "oversubstantive" in our law. Indeed, the vocabulary of
American theorists does not yet even include the term precisely parallel to "formalistic" for use in criticizing the oversubstantive in our law:
"substantivistic." Yet if our system tends to err more heavily on one
side than on the other, it probably tends to be oversubstantive, rather
than overformal.30 If! am right, Judge Posner's own theories of statutory interpretation and precedent might be criticized as "substantivistic." I will, among other things, explain how so in the next two
sections.
IV.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Judge Posner does not have a comprehensive general theory of
statutory interpretation, positive or normative. 31 He does not even ad29. Judge Posner, of course. makes room for concepts. What he does not acknowledge is
their formal character.
30. See Summers, Theory, supra note 13, at 408-09.
31. The main questions in such a normative theory include: (1) Why have a normative theory in the first place? (2) From what sources do issues of interpretation arise? (3) What are the
leading types ofinterpretative arguments? (4) How are such arguments to be differentiated? (5)
What is the nature and force of each type of argument? (6) What further is to be learned by
subclassifying the various types of arguments under a more limited set of general categories, e.g.,
linguistic, systemic, teleological- evaluative, intentional? (7) Which types of arguments are most
likely to produce the same decisional outcomes under the same statute at the hands of different
interpreters? (8) Which arguments are formal and which not? (9) How are conflicts between
such arguments generally to be resolved, and why? (10) In addition to "weighing and balancing," what other basic modes of resolving conflicts between arguments are there? (11) What is
the relative overall role of each leading type of argument within the system, considering the
extent of its availability and its relative decisiveness? (12) How far is it possible to construct
useful general models of the best possible overall justifications for the resolution of relatively
discrete and basic interpretational problems such as ambiguity, vagueness, overgenerality, undergenerality, gaps, conflicts between statutes, obsolescence, and legislative mistakes? How do
any resulting models differ and why? (13) How far can law govern the nature and force of
interpretive arguments and the resolution of conflicts between them? How far does law govern
them? (14) What is the appropriate style and structure of judicial opinions in statutory interpretation cases? (15) How far is interpretation a matter of factual inquiry and how far is it a matter
of evaluation? See generally D. MACCORMICK & R. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING STATUTES -A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (forthcoming 1991).
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dress all of the leading types of arguments that figure in statutory interpretation. Nor does he single out any one leading type of argument
and systematically treat its various facets. And he does not explore
the various ways courts resolve conflicts benyeen arguments. In all
this, perhaps he is hardly to be faulted. The theory of the entire subject is still in its infancy (despite much promising literature of late).
Judge Posner vigorously attacks the linguistic "plain-meaning" argument (although without defining it very closely) (pp. 262-302).
Here, too, he joins most American academics and many judges. On
the other hand, he admits that communication thmµgh the written
word is often successful (p. 295). He also indicates that in his view the
plain meaning argument has a "valid core," and he enjoins judges not
to "be too quick to override the apparent meaning" (p. 280). But he
does not develop these points, and one is left with the overall impression that he has relatively little faith in argumentation that is largely
linguistic, and thus in this sense formal. While he is willing to turn to
purposive arguments (pp. 267, 274), to arguments from intention
rooted in legislative history (pp. 104, 262), and to interpretive arguments of still other types, his heart is not in these specific types of
arguments, either.
While his overall normative approach cannot be reduced to a single argument, he does try to encapsulate his approach in this sentence:
"Maybe the best thing to do when a statute is invoked is to examine
the consequences of giving the invoker what he wants and then estimate whether those consequences will on the whole be good ones" (p.
300). He qualifies this, and stresses that judges should not ignore the
formal language of the statute; but he does not develop this approach
systematically, either. 32 He prefers "the interpretation that has, all
things considered, the better consequences," which "may by virtue of
that fact be the 'correct' interpretation" (p. 105). For Judge Posner,
the "better consequences" to be considered certainly include the substantively best result on the merits. Judge Posner's overall approach
downplays the formal language of the statute. It is not merely substantive. It may even be oversubstantive, i.e., "substantivistic," for
while Judge Posner does not ignore the formally authoritative text, he
strongly embraces a substantive and consequentialist justificatory
ethic. This priority comes out not only in his emphasis on the substantive consequences of alternative interpretations but also in his vigorous
32. The fullest general statement appears at p. 300 and is as follows:
This approach, which is pragmatic, does not justify, much less entail, ignoring the text.
Not only is the text a source of information about the consequences of alternative "interpretations," but among the consequences to be considered is the impact that unpredictable
statutory applications will have on communication between legislature and court. Normally, indeed, if communicative intent or legislative purpose can be discerned - in other
words, if imaginative reconstruction works - that will be the end of the case.
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rejection of "plain meaning" argumentation. 33
Statutes are generally formulated in words: ordinary, technical, or
both. Ordinary words may have ordinary meanings or technical
meanings Oegal or nonlegal) or special meanings. Technical words
may have technical meanings Oegal or nonlegal) or special meanings.
A court's ultimate interpretive conclusion, then, may look to (1) ordinary meaning, or (2) technical meaning, or (3) special meaning, 34 or
may take the form of (4) a decision in which the court assigns a clarified meaning to the statute (as, for example, where a statute is elliptical), or (5) simply a decision in which the court makes it all up largely
from scratch. The fourth of these qualifies to some extent as a genuine
interpretive conclusion; the fifth hardly qualifies at all. The line between (1), (2), and (3) on the one hand, and (4) on the other, may not
be sharp. The line between (4) and (5) definitely is not sharp.
The above five interpretive conclusions might be supported by linguistic, systemic, teleological, intentional, and evaluative arguments. 35
My primary interest here is in the linguistic, though, as we will see, the
materials out of which such arguments are appropriately constructed
are not confined to the bare text alone.
At least three types of linguistic arguments should be distinguished: the first is the argument from an ordinary meaning of ordinary words; the second is the argument from a technical meaning of
ordinary or technical words; and the third is the argument from a special meaning of ordinary or technical words based not only on the
words in question but on how they are used in other parts of the section of the statute involved, in other sections of the statute, and in
closely related statutes. One may call this third type a coherence or
harmonization argument. A prima facie forceful argument from ordinary meaning might be canceled or displaced by evidence of a technical meaning (which might include, for example, resort to history of the
term in the law), or might be canceled or displaced by a special meaning deriving from harmonization with the rest of the statute. On the
other hand, this third type of argument might also reinforce the interpretive conclusion supported by an argument from an ordinary meaning or an argument from a technical meaning.
Judge Posner sometimes uses the phrase, "plain meaning," not so
much to designate one (or more) types of meaning in the senses above
as to refer to a kind of judgment in the particular instance that the
meaning of the statute is plain. Now, the interpretive conclusion that
33. Judge Posner's criticisms are hardly idiosyncratic. The American academic literature on
statutory interpretation is replete with them.
34. By special meaning, I mean either (1) a meaning different from an ordinary meaning of
an ordinary word, and at the same time a meaning that is not yet an established technical mean·
ing of that ordinary word, or (2) a meaning of a technical word that is not the technical meaning
of that technical word.
35. See generally D. MACCORMICK & R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, at 512-25.
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is thus "plain" could be an ordinary meaning, or a technical meaning
(legal or nonlegal), or a special meaning, or perhaps even a "clarified"
meaning, as above. When the interpretive conclusion is an ordinary
meaning of ordinary words, the interpreter will usually seek to support
this conclusion by an appeal to ordinary language. Of course, other
types of argument might be invoked to support this conclusion, too,
including the argument from coherence with other parts of the statute,
and the argument from ultimate statutory purpose. Again, other types
of arguments might conflict with the argument from ordinary meaning, as well. Most of Judge Posner's assault is addressed, directly or
indirectly, to what I call the argument from ordinary meaning, and
does not apply to what I call the argument from technical meaning or
to the argument from statutory harmonization in support of a special
meaning.
The argument from ordinary meaning is exceedingly complex, and
Judge Posner is correct to say that its deployment is not merely a matter of knowing how to use a dictionary or how to consult a grammar
book. The argument takes some account of context and postulates a
competent and informed user of ordinary language. It also acknowledges the legislative purposes. That is, it takes account of the purposes
that a competent and informed user of those words could be said to
have had in using them in the general circumstances involved. The
argument does not, however, simply collapse into the independent argument from that interpretation which would best serve the ultimate
statutory purpose. I will not now, however, attempt to develop and
characterize the entire positive structure and content of the argument
from ordinary meaning, or attempt to differentiate it from other
nonlinguistic types of arguments. Instead, I turn to the Posnerian assaults on the argument from ordinary meaning - assaults that, I may
add, occur against a background of increasing resort to the argument
by the Supreme Court. 36
Judge Posner does not flatly affirm that the argument from ordinary meaning cannot consistently serve values appropriate to statutory
interpretation. Yet at numerous points he appears highly skeptical
(pp. 262-302). In my view, the argument from ordinary meaning,
when appropriately in play, serves relevant interpretational values,
and thus has general justificatory force of its own. I have already indicated that the argument from ordinary meaning may be viewed largely
as textual and therefore formal, especially when contrasted with Judge
Posner's substantive consequentialism. The values that the ordinary
meaning argument serves might also be conceptualized as rationales
for interpretive formality.
36. See. e.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146 (1989); Commissioner v.
Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 120 (1987); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93 (1985);
Griffen v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982).
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Perhaps most obvious, the argument from ordinary meaning serves
the values of legitimacy in lawmaking, and of representative democracy. As the Supreme Court has stressed, "Congressmen typically
vote on the language of a bill," 37 and that language is often ordinary
language. Certainly the members of the legislature and the legislative
drafters can be assumed to know and understand the English language
and the ordinary usage of English words. Relatedly, the argument
from ordinary meaning is hardly in itself purposeless or intentless. A
proposition the Supreme Court frequently cites is this: "[W]e must, of
course, start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used." 38
At the same time, judicial adherence to the ordinary meaning of
ordinary words in the statute may encourage the legislature to legislate
more explicitly and thereby discourage "legislation" hidden in mere
committee reports and the like, "legislation" which may well not have
gained true democratic assent and legitimacy if more explicit language
had been used in the statutory text. 39 Such "hidden legislation" is all
the more objectionable because most members of Congress do not see
committee reports and the like, and because it excludes or diminishes
the role of the executive in the lawmaking process. The President
signs only the bill that Congress presents to the President.40
Judicial adherence to the relevant ordinary meanings of ordinary
words can also operate to encourage careful drafting and thus serve
not only legitimacy and democracy but also the values specific to the
rule of law. Among other things, the legislative drafter will know that
any intended departures from what would otherwise be the ordinary
meaning must be made clear in the final draft of the statute.4 1
Furthermore, the institutional competence of courts to make fullscale legislative judgments about ends and means is itself limited. In
following the dictates of the argument from the ordinary meaning of
the statutory words, the court may avoid the necessity of making complex legislative judgments about the reasonableness of ultimate purposes and about the suitability of means. 42 At the same time, judicial
adherence to the ordinary meaning of ordinary words in the statute
restricts the opportunity for strong-willed judges to substitute their
own personal political views for those of the legislature with respect to
ends and means. 43 This value is relatively neutral. A wilful judge may
37.
38.
39.
40.
1986).
41.
42.
43.

United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985).
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. l, 9 (1962).
See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 345; Wallace v. Christenson, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559-60 (9th Cir.

See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 285 n.10 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See TVA. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 (1978).
See Commissioner v. Asphalt Prods., Inc., 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987).
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be of virtually any political hue: left, right, or other.
One further value (of many) that adherence to ordinary meaning
can serve is the protection of reliance on published law, and thus,
again, the rule of law itself. In following ordinary meaning, the court
may be (and often will be) protecting the interests of those citizens
who appropriately relied on such meaning. To subject them to a special meaning based on unenacted legislative history may be to jerk the
rug from beneath them. This is not only unfair, but disserves the rule
of law as well. 44
According to a second species of skepticism about the argument
from ordinary meaning, the argument is inherently (or at least typically) question-begging. 45 If true, the argument from ordinary meaning could not have general justificatory force. In my view, the charge
is false. The charge may arise because of the way the argument is
presented. Judges often make the argument in highly abbreviated
terms without offering any grounds or subsidiary argumentation that
the words really do have the ordinary meaning that the interpreter
attributes to them. Yet, there is plainly much scope for subsidiary
argumentation in support of (or opposed to) a conclusion that the statute has a given ordinary meaning. The overall process of marshaling
subsidiary argumentation to support such an interpretive conclusion
can be quite multifaceted.
The subsidiary argumentation to which I refer consists of arguments that may support a given ordinary meaning not merely over a
competing ordinary meaning (as where the word has several ordinary
meanings) but also over a possible technical meaning, or over a possible special meaning, or indeed, over no general type of meening at all
but merely over a decision as to the application of the statute. The
interpreter may begin with a list of possible ordinary meanings that
the word or words in issue might have. Is the claimed ordinary meaning one of those? Is it recognized in a good dictionary? Is the claimed
ordinary meaning as used in the statute consistent with applicable
rules of grammar? If the answers here are "yes," they obviously provide some subsidiary argumentation supporting the claimed interpretive conclusion that the statutory meaning is this ordinary meaning.
The general context of use also generates subsidiary argumentation
that rules out some of the many meanings of a word. For example, the
word "draw" has many dictionary meanings, but where the word appears in a statute dealing with the drawing of checks the general context of use makes obvious that other meanings are irrelevant.
Would a competent ordinary user of the words in circumstances
parallel to those of the statutory draftsman mean the ordinary mean44. See Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 131-33 (1983).
45. Judge Posner attacks the ordinary meaning argument on this general ground. Seep. 263.
There are several ways to interpret "question-begging" here. I consider only two in the text.
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ing of the words? If so, this too would provide a subsidiary argument.
An ordinary meaning presupposes standard circumstances of use recognizable by the competent user of the language. One has to be able to
say to oneself: "In circumstances X, if I wish to convey ordinary
meaning A, then I should use form of words M." When those circumstances are present, then ordinary meaning A of the words M would,
without more, be appropriately attributed to the legislative drafter.
The circumstances appropriate to use of the word in issue may or may
not be present. Thus, a supporting subsidiary argument may or may
not be generated, depending on the circumstances. This mode of subsidiary argumentation might be recast in terms of standard purposes of
language users. Ordinary meanings of words presuppose standard
purposes to convey just those meanings, and these purposes can be
defined in terms of appropriate circumstances of usage.
A further variety of subsidiary argumentation in support of attributing a given ordinary meaning to statutory words is simply that this
meaning is the one that best coheres substantively with the apparent
meanings of the rest of the words in the statutory phrase, sentence, or
paragraph, considered as a linguistic unit within ordinary language.
Still another type of subsidiary argument takes the specific form of
ruling out competing technical or special meanings for an ordinary
word in light of special knowledge of facts about the matters in question that make it appropriate to rule those meanings out.
The foregoing analysis is hardly exhaustive, yet it demonstrates
that the argument from ordinary meaning is not inherently questionbegging or "conclusory." When the general argument from ordinary
meaning is in play, subsidiary arguments can usually be given to support a conclusion that the appropriate interpretation consists of a
given ordinary meaning.
Nevertheless, the charge that the argument from ordinary meaning
is, if not inherently, then at least not infrequently question-begging
may still survive. Construed differently, the charge might be that the
interpreter, by ignoring any sources of unclarity external to the language of the statute, begs the question as to any issue of meaning that
arises only if these external sources of unclarity are taken into account.
One of Judge Posner's examples here is well known:
The statute said that a bequest in a will complying with specified formalities was enforceable. There was no ambiguity until one brought in from
outside the fact that the person named in the bequest had murdered the
author of the will.... [The] plain-meaning approach rules out arguments of external ambiguity, and by doing so artificially truncates the
interpretive process.46
46. P. 264. This "old jurisprudential chestnut" is also discussed at pp. 105-06. For another
example, see p. 269 (a military radio message, technically incomplete, with clear implicit
meaning).
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But in my view, the argument from ordinary meaning presupposes
that the interpreter knows and appropriately takes into account at
least the essential facts of the case giving rise to the question whether
the statutory language applies. Further, the interpreter should recognize the limits to human foresight, and also recognize that some things
may be taken for granted in communicating through ordinary language. 47 Indeed, if nothing could ever be taken for granted in the use
of ordinary language, that language would lose much of its utility:
These points are relevant to Judge Posner's example, in which the issue of interpretation cannot even be seen for what it is unless the facts
of the case - the legatee murdered the testator - are taken into account. The case is precisely one raising a question of possible statutory overgenerality in which the court, in the absence of anything
more specific, must reason about what a legislature in using ordinary
language may reasonably be considered to have taken for granted.
One line of reasoning would be that, in light of widely accepted moral
principles, the legislature took it for granted that a court would assume the legislature did not mean to reward murderers. Perhaps
Judge Posner himself adopts truncated conceptions of ordinary language and of the process of communication through ordinary language
when he says the argument from ordinary meaning cannot itself take
account of such an "external" fact as that the legatee murdered the
testator. 48
Those skeptical about the ordinary meaning argument might raise
yet a third basic question: Because of change, obsolescence, ambiguity
(both internal and external), vagueness, ellipses, the plurality of linguistic communities, and other possible sources of linguistic unclarity,
are the conditions required by the argument from ordinary meaning so
rare that this mode of argument can be at best only a minor justificatory resource in the interpretation of statutes? Judge Posner seems to
assume as much. 49 Yet he also concedes that communication through
ordinary language is often successful (pp. 293-96). Perhaps he thinks
that when a legislative drafter picks up a pen, clear communication
through ordinary language tends more often than not to stop. It is
true that appellate judges have a steady diet of cases in which sources
of unclarity in statutes do materialize. Yet appellate judges frequently
rely on the argument from ordinary meaning, the Supreme Court in47. I do not see why Judge Posner should disagree with this. See his emphasis on "unspoken
understandings" at p. 294.
48. Even if Judge Posner is not unduly truncating the argument from ordinary meaning (and
I believe he is), it still would not necessarily follow that his example demonstrates that an argument from the language alone would be question-begging. So long as reasons with some force
could be given for having the interpreter focus solely on the authoritative language, the question
would not be begged.
49. See chs. 9-10. Judge Posner gives special emphasis to change and obsolescence, and in
my view greatly overemphasizes these. I believe ambiguity and vagueness are more common.
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creasingly so. 50 Additionally, in many statutes, language and communicative assumptions pose few or no issues of interpretation. These
statutes are cast largely in ordinary language. I am prepared to assume that one reason these statutes pose few or no issues is simply that
judges, practicing lawyers, and others accept the argument from ordinary meaning as determinative under such statutes. If I am correct,
the argument is a major rather than a minor justificatory resource in
statutory interpretation, outside and inside courts.
Fourth, Judge Posner sometimes appears to assume that, to be a
significant or truly viable general mode of interpretive argument, the
argument from ordinary meaning must always prevail over competing
arguments (p. 264). Without doubt, the argument from ordinary
meaning may be canceled by a competing argument from technical
meaning, or by an argument from harmonization with other parts of
the statute. Also, the argument from ordinary meaning may be overridden by the argument from ultimate statutory purpose, or by still
other competing interpretive arguments. 51 Moreover, the argument
from ordinary meaning is subject to limiting exceptions. For example,
it generally loses its force when it generates a manifestly absurd or
manifestly unjust result. Or, to cite a second example, where the ordinary meaning of implementing language is overgeneral in relation to
its facial statutory purpose, the ordinary meaning will often be cut
back to fit that purpose. Points of this nature, however, also apply to
all the other leading types of interpretational arguments. If, to qualify
as an important mode of argumentation, an argument must always
prevail when appropriately in play, no type of interpretive argument
would be important. No single type of interpretive argument, when
appropriately in play, always prevails.
Furthermore, we must be wary of minimizing the true place of the
argument from ordinary meaning by exaggerating the size of the category of cases in which it fails to prevail. Cases in which the conditions
for the availability of the argument are not present in the first place
should not be included in this category. These conditions are not really present when, for example, the statute is poorly drafted, or the
statute is plainly obsolete or outmoded, or the language is highly
vague. 52
In my view, Judge Posner does not give the argument from ordinary meaning its just due. If I am right, this argument is the primary
justificatory resource in statutory interpretation. There is much about
50. See cases cited supra note 36.
51. See D. MACCORMICK & R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, at 479-86. In this forthcoming
book, we also develop the argument that American theorists much overdo "weighing and balancing" as a mode of settling conflicts between interpretational arguments. Judges invoke other
important modes, too, including cancelation and priorital overriding.
52. But see pp. 267-69 (discussing United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985)).
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the argument that we do not yet fully understand, but this state of
affairs is likely to be remedied in the next decade.
V.

PRECEDENT

Again, Judge Posner does not seek to provide a comprehensive
general theory of precedent, either positive or normative. 53 Indeed, it
is difficult to know exactly what Judge Posner's theory is. His approach to precedent, like his theory of statutory interpretation, is fragmentary and unsystematic. And there is deep tension between various
positions he takes. In very general terms, perhaps the most fundamental choice here is whether (1) the judge is to follow precedent in rulelike fashion, or (2) the judge is to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether to follow any given precedent, almost as if every case were
one of first impression, with precedent only a "factor to be weighed"
in the overall decisional process. Judge Posner says several things that
point toward the former. From time to time he acknowledges that
binding precedents squarely on point really do exist (pp. 94-95, 13233, 455-56). Moreover, he acknowledges that following precedent is a
content-independent principle (and thus, in my terms, a formal principle) that generates a "reason apart from its [substantive] soundness.... " 54 In tum, Judge Posner identifies a variety of rationales that
justify the general practice of following precedent, including, of
course, "stability" (pp. 94, 98, 118, 119, 260). He also refers to the
"limited license" of judges to change the rules in mid-course (p. 50).
Yet, at other moments, he sounds very different, and seems even to
embrace a kind of ad hoc approach in which the judge (at least the
higher appellate judge) is, in every case, to weigh and balance whether
to follow precedent, viewing precedent as merely one "factor" in the
overall decisional process:
Admittedly it is a legal convention - though one not fully shared by
the rest of the community or even by the entire legal profession - that a
decision foursquare in accord with a recent decision by the highest court
of the jurisdiction is "correct" by virtue of its conformity to authority.
But it is a weak convention. [p. 80] ·
53. The questions in a general nonnative theory of precedent include the following: (1) Why
should we have such a normative theory in the first place? (2) How is the principle of stare
decisis to be formulated, and in what sense is it a formal principle? (3) What are the rationales
behind the formal principle of stare decisis? (4) When is a precedent to be considered settled
law? What factors rationally figure in this judgment? (5) What factors may rationally undermine a once-settled precedent? (6) Within a precedent, what is holding and what is dictum? (7)
On what courts is a precedent binding? (8) What court can overrule a precedent? What norms
govern the exercise of a power to overrule, and how are they to be formulated? (9) What are the
appropriate interactions between statutes and precedents? Contract terms and precedents? Constitutions and precedents?
54. P. 260. Posner adds that there is "no social interest in continuity or a smooth fit, as such,
between successive cases." P. 260. But cf. p. 81 (discussing "the political foundations of
precedent").
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The later court decides whether to read the earlier decision
broadly or narrowly and, if it cannot be narrowed sufficiently to distinguish the present case, whether to overrule it. That court has the power,
and it also has more information, just by virtue of coming later. The
decision of how much weight to give the earlier precedent - whether to
apply it at all, and if so how broadly - is a pragmatic decision in which
the uncertainty that will be created by a too casual attitude toward past
decisions - and the additional work that such an attitude will create for
the courts both by requiring more time on each case and, as a result of
the greater uncertainty, engendering more cases - are compared with
the increased risk of error that an uncritical view of past decisions will
create. [p. 98]
. . . . Fidelity to precedent is just another consideration - another
policy or principle - to be placed in the balance in deciding whether a
particular outcome would be a suitable means to the judicial end. So far,
so good. [p.107; footnote omitted]
. . . . The order in law is of decisions by lawyers' committees that we
call appellate courts, and these decisions frequently are ill informed, outmoded, or ignoble. The obeisance that judges owe them depends on the
intrinsic merit of the previous decisions, which is variable, and on the
balance between the claims of stability and of substantive justice. [p.261]

From these and still other passages, 55 it would appear that Judge
Posner believes a judge (at least of a higher appellate court) should be
free to determine on a case-by-case basis whether to depart from any
and all precedents. Judge Posner does not even appear to require a
strong prima facie showing that the precedent is itself substantively
unsound to trigger the full-scale inquiry into whether the precedent
should be overruled. If this is his view, then every precedent becomes
a candidate for overruling, and every case becomes a kind of case of
first impression. And instead of precedent generating a genuine formal reason for decision (p. 260), it simply becomes a factor to be
weighed (p. 107). Stare decisis is at most a "tug" at the judge's elbow
(p. 90). The distinction between holding and dictum, then, is not at all
hard and fast; rather, it is made largely on the basis of "policy" (pp.
96-97).
Judge Posner believes that most American judges are preoccupied
with precedent as formal authority for decisions (p. 97). At the same
time, he frequently approaches the other extreme. His own normative
theory of precedent, like his normative theory of statutory interpretation, is highly substantive. Indeed, it may even be substantivistic.
That is, it may be underformal in the respect that it fails to accord
55. See, e.g., p. 455 ("judges are compelled to fall back on the grab bag of informal methods
of reasoning that I call 'practical reason' ").
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sufficient force to the formal principle of stare decisis and thus to the
various rationales behind that principle. 56 In nearly all of the above
passages, Judge Posner even appears to accord relatively little weight
to the efficiency that goes with regarding most precedents as settled
law rather than as decisions always subject to full reexamination. He
also fails to acknowledge that on many legal questions on which there
is precedent, the force of substantive reason on each side is more or
less in equipoise or at least not clearly in favor of one outcome, so that
the "resolutive" function of precedent in such cases accordingly takes
on special significance. s1
VI.

LAW'S AUTONOMY

One of Judge Posner's most general theses is that law has relatively
little autonomy. 58 I have deferred this topic until now because my
commentary on this thesis must inevitably draw on what I have discussed above. Judge Posner really has a dual thesis. First, he thinks
that law, as a social phenomenon, is highly dependent on other, nonlegal, sources for its substantive content and, presumably, for its required social acceptance and for its modes of applicational analysis.
Second, he thinks that law, as an academic discipline, is highly dependent on other disciplines for facts and values relevant to law's evaluation and improvement, for models of legal reasoning, and for ways of
studying law and its workings.
Neither branch of this dual thesis is new. Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., Roscoe Pound, and numerous others subscribed to such views long
ago. What is perhaps most notable in recent times is the acceptance in
the law schools of economics as a discipline of relevance to law, a
development in which Judge Posner himself has had a very large hand.
Still, I cannot agree with Judge Posner that even economics has ••ravished" law or legal education. 59 Indeed, the actual impact of economics on the positive content of specific legal doctrines has, on the whole,
not been very great. At the same time, in the law schools today, scholars and students are also more receptive than ever before to instruction
56. Perhaps one factor driving his overall view is his low estimate of the substantive quality
of precedent in our system. Evidence of such an estimate appears at pp. 94, 240, 261 & 445.
57. Judge Posner omits in his book any reference to several of the standard rationales for
precedent other than "stability" and the like. For example, he does not take up Professor
Fuller's point that precedent, as a form of antecedent law, serves as a major source of those
standards on which truly effective adjudication is dependent. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 372-81 (1978).
58. Yet at one point he does write of the "essential characteristics of the legal enterprise." P.
455.
59. P. 442. For a systematic evaluation, see Summers & Kelley, 'Economists' Reasons' for
Common Law Decisions -A Preliminary Inquiry, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 213 (1981). (This
article, alas, was never indexed in the Index to Legal Periodicals. Nor were any articles in the

first few issues of this journal.)
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from all academic fields that bear on law - philosophy, history, sociology, political science, literature, and more.
Judge Posner sees several implications of the "new" dependence of
law on other disciplines. I will confine myself to two of those. First,
he occasionally suggests that this dependency signifies that both law as
a social phenomenon and law as a traditional academic discipline are
in pretty bad shape. He implies that we really cannot have a "thrilling
vision" of law, given its dependent, parasitic, and servile status (p.
460). In the same vein, he suggests that, given the dependency of academic law on other disciplines, traditional academic lawyers could be
thought of as "mere water bearers and hod carriers of theorists from
other disciplines" (p. 437). The second, and the most obvious practical implication for Judge Posner, is simply that law, and so academic
lawyers, must turn to other sources and disciplines for the facts and
values relevant to the content of law, and even for appropriate models
of applicational legal reasoning.
In response, one may say that, if law as a social phenomenon and
academic law are in pretty bad shape because of this dependency, then
so too are the economy as a social phenomenon and academic economics. Nearly everything Judge Posner says about law and academic
law is also true of the economy, and of academic economics (at least in
its normative facets). Indeed, matters are even worse. The economy
as a social phenomenon is deeply and in manifold ways dependent on
the social phenomenon of law. Normative economics, as an academic
discipline, is dependent on a theory of value deriving from philosophy.
And the policy prescriptions generated by normative economics and
philosophy must inevitably undergo significant transformation on the
anvil of law prior to any legal implementation. 60 Indeed, a "raw" policy prescription, even though otherwise sound, may not even be susceptible of reliable legal implementation and thus may have to be
abandoned altogether. What an unthrilling vision all this must be for
champions of the autonomy of the economy and the autonomy of normative economics!
Obviously, lawyers must learn from economics (and other disciplines) in making and applying law, and in studying and teaching law.
But this state of dependency can be overstated, too, and I believe
Judge Posner is guilty of overstatement. 61
•
The relative autonomy of law and academic law can be easily illustrated. First, law is not, in large measure, dependent on other phenomena, or on other fields of academic study for answers to the
60. See generally Summers, Some Considerations Which May Lead Law Makers to Modify a
Policy When Adopting It as Law, 141 ZElTSCHRlFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT
41-42 (1985) (discussing various desiderata, including having law take the form of rules and be
intelligible, " 'factually' administrable," and "appropriately prospective").
61. Judge Posner occasionally offers a qualification, but one wonders whether he is really
serious. See p. 434 ("No field is completely autonomous ....")
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question: What are the essential elements of a system of law? Answers to this basic defining question are to be found emergent in the
subject matter of law itself, and these answers have an integrity and
complexity of their own. Second, once the elements of a legal system
are in place, the law of that system, and not other things, regulates the
creation of statutes, precedents, custom, and other forms of law. As
Hans Kelsen emphasized, law largely regulates its own creation. 62
Third, not every statute, precedent, or other species oflaw is significantly dependent for its rational substantive content on the findings
and teachings of other disciplines such as economics or sociology.
Much of our law does not require or presuppose values or empirically
verified generalizations beyond the resources of intelligent common
sense, the humanist tradition, and the requisites of legal implementation. This is true, for example, of that core of the criminal law and of
those parts of civil law that track widely accepted moral norms. To
cite only one more example, most written law consists not of statutes
but of contracts, and most contracts are not dependent in a substantive
way on the resources of other disciplines.
Fourth, with regard to the content of all statutes, all precedents,
and all species of law, formal considerations of a distinctively legal
kind play a major role. Constitutive formality, validity formality, continuity formality, close-ended formality, expressional formality, and
fiat formality 63 are, in light of their various rationales, fused with the
substance of particular statutes, precedents, and other law. These
(and still other) varieties of formality, all of which derive from "inside
the law," shape the contours oflaw's material content and also render
it fit for legal implementation.
Fifth, the methods that lawyers and judges apply in interpreting
statutes and in following precedent are more distinctive than Judge
Posner allows. For example, arguments from the ordinary or technical meaning of statutory words, from harmonization with the rest of
the statute and with related statutes, and from ultimate statutory purpose often involve systematic analysis and sophistication more or less
special to law. The same is true of much reasoning about binding precedent. We must be wary of the exceptionally able ex-law professor
who is disposed to take much for granted here. One hardly knows
where to begin. The skills of sound distinguishing, reconciling, and
synthesizing of precedents are highly refined in the law. The differentiation of settled precedent from that which is not yet settled is no
simple matter in our system, and has little by way of counterpart
outside the law. Nor is the identification of what is authoritative in a
62. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE (A. Wedberg trans. 1943).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 17-30.
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precedent a simple matter with no distinctive complexities. 64 Identifying what is authoritative in a precedent may even require sophisticated
doctrinal history (including inquiry into the sequence in which cases
have arisen). What existing precedents "stand for" is in part a matter
of how they have come to be. An ahistoric discipline such as economics can tell us almost nothing about this. 65
Of course, the scope for all this technique is partly determined by
what the judges of the system collectively permit. If judges were to
choose, as a normative matter, to play fast and loose with precedents
(or statutes), the law would be far less determinative, and judges
would be forced to fall back on what Judge Posner refers to as the
"grab bag" of informal methods of "practical reason" when applying
law (p. 455), methods not relatively distinctive and in no sense autonomous. This, however, would be because the judges had given up on
law-like methods and not because of anything inherent in applicational
legal reasoning.
Finally, law has, or seems to have, a kind of specialized value theory of its own. At the least, some categories of values are more or less
inherently implicated in law, in tolerably well-ordered societies anyhow. To the extent that these values are in some sense legal, we have
here another dimension of law's relative autonomy, although law remains, of course, heavily dependent on still other categories of values,
too.
Legal institutions such as adjudication depend for their moral
force and for the acceptability of their outcomes on the realization of
special participatory values. Accordingly, adjudication pointedly provides for various participating roles. 66 Also, as noted above, 67 a wide
range of values - rationales - lies behind the basic varieties of formality in the law, rationales that leave their imprint on the material
content of statutes, precedents, and other species of law. Many of
these rationales are so intimately legal that they are often characterized as "rule of law" values. Similarly, I have identified a category of
values that figures in the justificatory force of certain standard argu64. The topic has even engaged our very best theorists. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Reflections on

Holding and Dictum, 39 J. LEGAL Eouc. 431 (1989).
65. I have elsewhere argued in quite specific terms that law, legal analysis, and legal theory
are not reducible to economics. See Summers, Economics and the Autonomy ofLaw, Legal Analysis, and Legal Theory, in VERNUNFf UNO ERFAHRUNG JM RECHTSDENKEN DER GEGENWART
395-408 (T. Eckhoff, L. Friedman & J. Uusitalo eds. 1986); Summers, The Future of Economics
in Legal Education: Limits and Constraints, 33 J. LEGAL Eouc. 337, 344-48 (1983).
66. See generally L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 705-08, 712-14, 727-29
(temp. ed. 1949) (moral force of adjudication is at its maximum where certain conditions, such as
participation by disputants, are met); Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes - A
Plea for Process Values, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974) (participatory governance and procedural
rationality are important to determining the quality of a legal process).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 17-30.
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ments in statutory interpretation 68 and in reasoning from precedent. 6 9
Then, too, legal values include a whole class of substantive reasons elsewhere I have called these "rightness" reasons - which are nonconsequentialist and yet dominate much of the common law. 70 Important past-regarding values are implicated in these reasons, including
justified reliance, good faith, fair notice, just desert, and more. We do
not yet fully understand how and why rightness reasons and their concomitant values are so prominent in the common law, but I will not be
surprised if the values that figure in these reasons are ultimately found
to be somehow distinctively congenial to the concerns of the common
law and its methodology. Certain implementational vall,les - values
having to do with the efficacy of factfinding, with the measurability of
harms, and the like - relate to the ultimate limits of law itself. To my
knowledge, no one has drawn all of the various categories of values I
have listed here together (and there may be more) and subjected them
to systematic analysis. 71 To the extent that the very nature of law and
of social ordering through law presupposes, draws upon, or implicates
such values in ways that give them special definition, content, and
meaning, these values are uniquely legal or intimately related to law
- and, perhaps, they comprise a significant domain of law's relative
autonomy.

VII.

LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE ACADEMY

Of course, Judge Posner is also ex-Professor Posner of the University of Chicago. In various places he expresses opinions on legal education and on his days as a student at the Harvard Law School. He
concedes that the case method and the Socratic method remain "invaluable" methods that provide "essential preparation for the practice of
law" (p. 3). Yet he also expresses grave doubt whether the Socratic
method really "teaches reasoning at all, beyond honing the students'
skills in identifying contradictions" (p. 98). Moreover, he suggests
that the system of "legal education" turns out lawyers who are uninterested in "legislative" facts - in the causes and consequences of social ills and in the social effects of legal doctrines generally (p. 468).
Indeed, he closes this work with a plea for much more science, especially social science, in law.
I have no quarrel with Judge Posner's plea for more science,
although I have less faith than he that science can so readily provide
68. See supra text accompanying notes 31-52.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
70. See generally Summers, Two Types ofSubstantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common Law Justification, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 752-74 (1978).
71. For a valuable treatment of several aspects of this subject, see P. STEIN & J. SHAND,
LEGAL VALUES IN WESTERN SOCIETY 1-113 (1974).
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answers for law. 72 I also doubt that Judge Posner could marshal
much evidence to support his conclusion that lawyers generally are
uninterested in "legislative facts," and I think even less evidence supports his suggestion that the Socratic method explains any aversion
lawyers may have to legislative factfinding. Certainly Judge Posner
leaves these matters unsupported.
But what I most wish to do is respond briefly to Judge Posner's
remarks on Socratic teaching and the case method. Although timehonored, Socratic teaching is now in decline in the American law
school, and it badly needs defenders. In my view its virtues are legion,
and go well beyond what Judge Posner at one point credits it with sharpening student sensitivity to "contradictions." I believe it fitting,
in this jurisprudential essay, to address the aspects of Socratic teaching
and the case method that relate to the very nature of law itself. Of
course, I can do so here only in suggestive terms.
The Socratic method is more faithful to the very nature of law than
other methods. Law is not like a temperature gauge from which one
merely reads off information. Law is inherently dialectical, in its creation and especially in its application. Much didactic teaching tends to
falsify this reality. Socratic teaching, which is dialectical, does not.
Socratic teaching is distinctively appropriate to American law.
Our law is vast and fast-moving. Even assuming that it would otherwise be desirable to teach, in didactic fashion, all the basic law of our
system, this could not be done in three years, and much of what was
"learned" in this fashion would be obsolete before long anyway. Socratic teaching necessarily requires limited focus on particular areas of
law, but the skills, attitudes of mind, and other qualities so imparted
are transferable to other areas.
Law is inherently applicative, and it purports to apply to reality
largely through the medium of language. Yet to a considerable extent
law's very meaning resides in how it applies to concrete fact. Dialectical teaching through the medium of case materials, with all their concrete factual richness, can provide a more authentic experience of the
reality of law for the participants than can didactic teaching. (This
may be different in "code" systems where law has a more abstract and
less applicative quality.)
The best Socratic teaching dwells more intimately than can didactic teaching upon the required qualities of reasons, and of rules, if
these qualities are to figure appropriately in legal analysis and justification. In this regard, law just is a kind of process of thought (having
positive as well as normative relevance). Consider, for example,
72. Cohen and Fuller also were skeptical about this. See Cohen, The Social Sciences and the
Natural Sciences, in THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THEIR INTERRELATIONS 437 (y/. Ogburn & A.
Goldenweiser eds. 1927), and see my summary of Fuller's views in Summers, supra note 2, at
442-44.
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thought about substantive reasons in the justification of judicial decisions. Some substantive reasons are much more appropriate than
others. Indeed, no fewer than ten major criteria may be relevant to
evaluating the appropriateness of a given type of substantive reason for
use in the law, criteria that must be explored to some extent in any
Socratic instruction worthy of the name. 73 Consider, as a second example, the process of thought that goes into the extraction and formulation of legal rules, the hypothetical testing of proposed formulations
of rules including the resort to limiting cases, the rational drawing of
lines in determining the contours of rules, and the determination of
whether facts relevant to the assessment of proposed formulations of
rules are available and what bearing their availability should have.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Judge Posner suggests that jurisprudence should not be the exclusive province of specialists (p. xiii). He means by this rather more
than that lawyers, law students, and others should take some interest
in the subject. He believes nonspecialists can also contribute solutions
to the problems of jurisprudence. But in such matters the proof is in
the pudding. Judge Posner has made a major and lasting contribution
in mediating between the disciplines of economics and law. In my
opinion, his attempt at jurisprudence is not quite so successful. This
should hardly be surprising, especially to followers of Adam Smith,
given that Judge Posner could not have put as much by way of resources into jurisprudence as he has put, over many years, and with so
much profit, into the economic analysis of law.

73. See Summers & Kelley, supra note 59, at 235-55; Summers, Why Common Law Courts
Seldom Need to Assess Closely the Comparative Force of Conflicting Substantive Reasons, in 1
REASON IN LAW 207 (E. Pattaro ed. 1987). These criteria are: (1) intrinsic justificatory force,
(2) conventional justificatory force, (3) commensurability with other reasons, (4) intelligibility
and persuasiveness, (5) transmutability into stable rule, (6) "guidesomeness," (7) efficient constructability, (8) possible arbitrariness of "boundary conditions," (9) general "range" of the reason, and (10) suitability for court use.

